Abstract: The aging of the global population, combined with changes in technology and cultural understandings of disease and the body, have thrust discussion and contestation over health into the center of local, national and global politics. In this essay I ask a deceptively simple question: whether the politics of health is "different" from the politics of other policy domains. On a number of dimensions, I conclude that health politics is in fact different. Voters and politicians in the developed world appear more likely to accept redistributive claims with respect to health than they are with other policy areas. Nations vary more widely in spending on other functions of government and policy than they do on health. Moral claims made about health are more likely to attach to its politics than to the politics of environment, labor, finance and energy. More than these other realms, health politics encompasses issues regarding identity, the human body and other personal matters that endow the health arena with greater significance. Bureaucratic agencies of state are more involved with provision and regulation of health politics than in other areas, and the science-related nature of state expertise allows science and medicine itself to be sculpted in deeply political ways. The essay concludes with implications for how political scientists should approach cross-policy generalizations with caution, and with a call for greater engagement with health politics -to do for political science what health economics, the history of medicine and medical sociology have done for other social science disciplines.
Is Health Politics Different?
The flourishing of life has engendered a new politics of health.
The year 2010 finds global human population at approximately 6.7 billion, up from 2.5 billion in 1950 and 1.7 billion in 1900. The median life expectancy in the United States rose from 69.8 in 1960 to 78.4 in 2008, and in many other countries (Australia, Canada, most countries in Western Europe, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea) life expectancy at birth is appreciably higher than in the U.S. The stunning growth of human population in recent centuries is due primarily not to higher reproductive rates but to higher life expectancy, and human longevity in turn is a function less of high-technology medical advances and more of improvements in nutrition, public health policies such as vaccination and infrastructure, and improvements in communicable disease treatment (World Bank 2010) .
For several reasons, human longevity has infused health politics with a significance that few other realms of contestation can match. The lengthening of the human life span has created unprecedented expectations about how long a person can live, about how long they ought to live, and about the quality of living while alive. Contemporary human societies tend to regard the death of a young adult or middle-aged adult as a greater tragedy than past societies did, not least because we would today have expected that adult to have lived longer. And there is evidence that human societies attach greater expectations of equality and equity to these health chances than they do to other realms of modern life (finance, education, employment) where unequal stakes prevail. These expectations and variations in them across citizens and societies occasion deep debates over whether and how societies ought to structure access to health services. Disparities in access to health services and treatments are widely understood to shape vast inequalities in life chances.
So too, with ingrained assumptions about the quantity of life, human societies have begun to attach greater meaning to its quality. And the meaning of "quality of life" is deeply tied up with human health. If we expect to live to eighty rather than to forty, we may care more about the free use of our limbs and human faculties. Long past the point when we no longer can or wish to procreate, we may care about the quality of our sexual functioning. We may care more about long-term mental health and cognitive functioning, our moods and our memories.
Yet the most profound link between human longevity and health politics stems from a deep material irony. The lengthening of human life means, in some basic sense, that humans spend more time being sick. This relation holds in some absolute sense; we live longer and thus have more chance to experience illnesses such as cancer. Yet this pattern also holds in a deeply interpretive sense; as expectations of health and functioning have risen, conditions that detract even moderately from a sense of optimal human functioning have become interpreted as diseases. Many common aspects of the human condition have become "medicalized" in this way, in part from science and in part from the profit motive (Greene 2007) .
Two brute facts of the "longer life, more sickness" relationship have transformed health politics.
First, in the past century there has been a rise in the incidence and politics of chronic disease. Chronic disease envelops those medical conditions that do not pass like influenza or a broken nose but persist for years or decades: high blood pressure, arrhythmia, rheumatic arthritis, clinical depression, Alzheimer's disease. Chronic disease has generated vast markets of technology and service for dealing with it, even when (perhaps especially when) there is no cure for the disease state itself. U.S. and global expenditure on health has skyrocketed in the past half century, with American public expenditure on health now amounting to nearly double its aggregate defense expenditures (already extremely high by comparison with other nations), while three-to-one to five-to-one ratios prevail for health-to-defense expenditures in Western European nations such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom (among OECD countries, only Israel and South Korea spend marginally more on defense than they do on health as societies).
The second brute fact concerns caregiving. Caregiving -the acts of one human or humans providing health services for another -counts among among the oldest of human relationships. Yet human longevity and the changing nature of sickness have transformed these interactions. Caregiving patterns have been rearranged in both institutions and markets, in ways that are politically and ethically relevant (Kleinman 2008) . In some cases, kinship, partnership and other social networks are transformed as the members of these networks take on new forms of labor. In other cases, the burden of caregiving is greater than family or kinship/partnership networks can efficiently bear, and markets for more complex care relationships surface, or care is foregone. Institutions provide care and represent sources of employment and income. These include nursing homes, eldercare facilities, long-term care facilities and other institutions, all of them well represented in democratic political systems. With these institutions and these human demands, the question of long-term care insurance in the United States and other countries has arisen as another central policy issue. ***** Health, then, has become a defining facet of modern life, and its politics all the more vital. Yet is health politics different?
An understanding of any such difference requires an answer to the question: different from what? I have in mind distinctions from distributive politics, economic politics, class politics, religious politics or identity politics in other forms. My question might be restated as follows: while it is undoubted that we should study health politics for its importance, will it conform easily to the models and understandings of politics that we already have in political science?
In this essay I entertain the possibility that health politics is in fact different from many of the patterns that political scientists and other social scientists study. By different I do not mean unique.
There are deep similarities between health politics and these other arenas of politics -pluralist policies, distributive policies and ideological strife over the role of government in health services provision and various social and cultural issues entangled in the meaning of health and public health. Yet as I hope to show, the differences are tangible, and focusing on these differences for health policy is especially useful for three reasons: (a) the importance of health policy as an area; (b) the fact that these differences in the health area have not received the exploration they deserve; and (c) the way in which the differences suggest important ways in which we change how we think about the standard models of politics.
1 I proceed speculatively because political scientists have not yet catalogued or established differences between health politics and other arenas. Compared to the study of politics in many other realms (labor, environmental), the study of health politics is in its infancy. As a set of plausible hypotheses, then, health politics is different in at least three dimensions.
1. There persist widely held notions and norms of equality in access to health services, due not least from health's status as a constitutive expression and measure of well-being. These beliefs have vast consequences for public policy, ranging from the provision of health insurance to funding for global health initiatives to the form of regulation of safety regarding health.
2. Health is intimately related to human identity in ways that echo class politics but elude simple binary and hierarchical relations. Class and economic politics often divides the wealthy from the less wealthy, or the owners of capital from labor. Yet the primary divides in health politics are not starkly and directly defined between those who are more or less healthy, or between those who provide health services and those who employ them. While there are wide geographic differences in health outcomes and institutions both globally and regionally, health politics does not often give rise to the kind of sectionalist politics associated with trade and industrial issues.
There are instead wealth and ideological differences associated with the proper role of the state in health provision and the appropriate generosity of health benefits. There are vast disparities based upon the particular kind of disease afflicting an individual, as in the United States those afflicted with breast cancer have in recent decades benefitted from political organization and cultural legitimacy far greater than that experienced by sufferers of hundreds of other diseases.
The differences go further still. Whereas humans often organize on the basis of claimed identities, many health conditions are those that humans would prefer to keep privatediseases that are sexually transmitted, that entail stigmatized conditions (such as obesity or a chronic infectious illness), and mental health disorders. In this way, the public organization of disease contrasts with its private experience.
3. Technology and expertise combine in powerful ways to differentiate health politics. Much if not most health care is delivered, organized and regulated by professionally or societally sanctioned experts. This pattern is as often true in developing, industrializing nations (consider India and its healers organized and legitimated in the Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani traditions) as in advanced industrialized countries. Organized in professions, guilds and other forms, these experts bear significant legal and cultural authority, and they are often remunerated at levels that are high in the income distribution of their societies. So, too, health technology creates fields of expertise, which in turn create and harness new forms of technology. This process of specialization undermines old orders, and it creates specific industrial interests, such as the biotechnical and medical device research enterprises. In the realm of health, technology meets concrete human meaning in the most tangible of ways. Scientific research has permitted for new and distinctive claims about identity; notice the novel and unpredictable way that evidence for possible genetic bases of homosexual attraction has become an important source of cultural as well as scientific legitimation of gay and lesbian identities in advanced democracies.
In following discussion, I examine four dimensions of health politics: (1) cross-national comparisons and similarities, especially the politics of insurance and access, (2) the role of regulation and the state (in areas concerning access and insurance, and in areas separate from these realms), (3) newly emergent "global health" politics, and (4) the politics of disease. In each of these dimensions, health politics differs from other realms of politics in ways that point to important research agendas for political scientists.
Health Politics and Insurance in Comparison
Health forms a vital (some would say the fundamental) component of human well-being. A person or group with vast landed, material or financial wealth can suffer greatly by virtue of illness. To the extent that people equate health with well-being, health welfare becomes partially internal, experienced tangibly in body, in mind and (for many) in soul. By contrast, well-being in other dimensions is often external (wealth) and/or attributed (status). To be sure, wealth, health and status are deeply correlated -those individuals and communities of higher income and status enjoy, on average, superior health. Yet wide variation in health experiences within and across income and class groups remains. Health may not be independent of wealth and status, yet it is far from reducible to these dimensions of welfare.
Beyond its personal dimension as a form of human experience, many observers and scholars argue or assume that some minimal health is necessary for human functioning in other realms such as citizenship, labor, education, consumption, reproduction, leisure and spirituality (Sen 1999 , Daniels 2001 Nussbaum 2002 Nussbaum , 2006 Sackett and Torrance 1978) . The idea animating these arguments is not that societies can or should aim at equality in health, but that they should aim for a kind of equal opportunity for health (Jacobs and Morone 2005 arcane legislative procedures such as the filibuster, and congressional committee jurisdictions (Steinmo and Watts 1995) .
In a series of well-known studies, Hacker (1998 Hacker ( , 2002 examined these cross-national differences and found them to be historically contingent. To begin with, Hacker re-examined the portrait of American generosity and, in the 1990s, found it too simple. There was nothing of "American exceptionalism" in terms of the fraction of wealth or income spent on health or health insurance. The U.S. differed appreciably from other advanced democracies, Hacker found, not in the amount of GDP devoted to health insurance but in the mode of financing and delivery: a system based upon private insurance companies, largely financed through employers for those of working age, without universal access, where vulnerable and elderly populations were covered with special (Medicare) or patchwork (Medicaid) programs. The American case was different less in scope than in institutional form.
Comparing the U.S. to Britain and Canada, Hacker (1998) More generally, Hacker (1998: 85; ) recommends comparing national health insurance regimes, historically and cross-nationally, along at least three critical dimensions of explanatory difference. These are:
 The characteristics of the population initially covered under public coverage (e.g., universal access v. wage-earners v. elderly and disabled);
 Whether the expansion of access occurred before the expansion of capacity, and vice versa;
 The extent to which physician-controlled private plans developed (low in the United Kingdom, for instance, but quite high in the United States).
It is these three factors, Hacker argues, that explain the divergent systemic developments between Britain, Canada and the United States (1998), and the first two of these factors help to explain why health insurance in the late twentieth-century United States was characterized by private provision while social insurance was characterized largely by public provision.
Hacker's insights stand up well to the passage of time. Even with the passage and implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 -the national health reform act which promises to achieve near-universal coverage for Americans -many of the differential features of the American model have been preserved (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010) . These include the private provision of health insurance (which not only remains but is enhanced by a government mandate that individuals purchase health insurance coverage), the lack of a universal system and the dominance of existing patchwork programs (much of the expansion of coverage to the poor comes through a large expansion of Medicaid, and Medicare's distinctive identity within the system remains). Table 1 ; these differences were noted by many authors examining cross-national differences, for example Rodwin and and Sandier 1995) . Yet in revealing ways, these differences have waned in recent decades. With the enactment and expansion of Medicare and Medicaid, as well as a corresponding (often subsidized) expansion of private health insurance, the share of health expenses paid out-of-pocket by American citizens declined significantly, and it now rests somewhat below the norm for countries tracked by the health expenses has come from insurance over the past few decades.
Recent changes to
What has not changed is the much higher average cost of health services in the United States, a difference that translates into much greater average expenditure for its citizens, both through insurance and out-of-pocket. Even though less than one in eight dollars spent on healthcare in the U.S. is out of pocket, the per-capita yearly payment was $912 in 2008, appreciably higher than all European countries save for Switzerland, which has long seen a much higher percentage of health spending out of pocket.
Hence while there has been convergence in the technical reach of insurance over health spending, the real-dollar cost of health to Americans, direct and indirect, has risen appreciably, a fact that generates tremendous income and social insecurity (Warren and Tyagi 2007) . A critical factor in this cost difference is the technology-intensive nature of American health care (Jacobs 1995; Cohen and Hanft 2004 and political economy specialists. And again, it marks the sphere of health politics as somewhat differentiated from other spheres; no such convergence has occurred for defense spending, for instance, or for changes in public sector spending in education (OECD 2009 (OECD , 2011 .
One reason for the convergence comes, again, from an examination of the cross-national data.
Health spending as a share of national resources has been growing everywhere, and this process has accelerated the role of public sector provision. As Figure 2 shows, in those OECD countries where health spending has increased most strongly as a percentage of GDP in the last 20 years, there has been a corresponding above-average rise in the percentage of that health spending done by the government.
Untangling the answers to these questions is not an easy enterprise, in part because the utilization of health services depends in part upon the willingness of the government to pay for, or subsidize, those services. But so too, the degree of government support will depend, at least in part, and subject to the contingencies of historical sequence and political economy, upon the aggregate demand for these services, which brings into play such factors as the aging of the population. (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010) .
At this writing, a central plank of the system, the so-called "individual mandate" whereby individual citizens are required to carry one or another form of health insurance or pay tax penalties, is under constitutional challenge, and conservative politicians have vowed to roll back part or all of the PPCA.
Once erected, national health regimes are not fixed in stone. Elected authorities often render institutional changes to these policies, and these changes arrive less incrementally and more often in What, then, is plausibly different about health politics in the provision of insurance and access?
The tendency of nations to grant broad access to health services and, in puzzlingly varied ways across time and space, to aim for reduced inequality of access among citizens even where other inequalities are tolerated and legitimated.
Health Regulation and Infrastructure: The Role of the State and Organized Expertise
Licensure and Legitimation. Health politics may be different in another way: its unique reliance upon, and expression of, the co-organization of expertise and state power. This difference is one of degree more than of kind; experts play critical roles in national and international debates over environmental policy, energy policy and of course economic and security policy. Yet the co-evolving roles of state and organized expertise in health show some features that are rarely, and sometimes never, duplicated in other realms. In variable ways that nonetheless span the globe, governments and societies endow legitimated healers with particular legal authority and cultural power. In many advanced, industrialized countries, officially legitimated experts alone have the power to prescribe and deliver medicine or medical procedures to citizens. Individuals without legitimation who attempt to provide medical services or products to a country's citizens can be, and often are, prosecuted for violations of national or sub-national statutes. There are many societies in which the legitimation applies to traditional healers, but the most common form of legitimation occurs in the granting of professional status to healers and the concomitant licensing of these professional healers for the practice of medicine (Abbott 1987 , Freidson 1988 , Rothman 1991 , Starr 1984 .
The organization of medical talent is not merely a social and economic fact -not merely a process by which healers organize themselves to differentiate themselves from others, endow themselves with status, and restrict the supply of their services and thereby drive up their income or increase consumer confidence in the provision of services -but an explicitly political reality. In many Western nations, the process by which physicians, nurses and other health professionals receive licensure is governed explicitly by the state, which grants medical and health service licenses. (In many cases, state licensure arrived along with or before the emergence of well-organized professional lobbies; state policies were not then, and are not now, simply an epiphenomenon of professional organization (Abbott 1987) .) In other ways, governments may also shape who gets to provide health services by regulating hospitals and other care facilities, or by restricting those who can prescribe medicines or process payments under a government health insurance plan.
In the operation of licensure, medical authorities and state authorities (often people who travel in both sectors) usually devise standards of training, examination or testing, and professional entry (Abbott 1988 , Freidson 1988 , Starr 1984 . In advanced industrialized countries in western Europe, Australia and Japan, these processes are carried out at the national level, whereas in the United States, medical and health services licensing is a sub-national affair at the state level. In general, the politics and political economy of licensure has been little studied among political scientists, and it represents an obvious research agenda in years to come, not least because these matters have been, and will continue to be, contested at the micro-level (nurse practitioners vying with doctors for control of clinical practice and laboratory work, for example) and the macro-level (governments and insurance companies regulating who can supply government-provided or -subsidized medical care).
Not surprisingly, those who are endowed with the license and status of legitimated expert and healer have both a natural basis of organization (the labels that allow for identification and status, health incomes, and ready-made professional networks and organizations) and a robust pattern of mobilization. Organized opposition from physician groups has been one of the principal obstacles to American legislation creating national health insurance (Starr 1984 , Quadagno 2005 , Chapin 2010 ), and as national regimes worldwide begin to grapple with cost containment in health care, pitched battles between physician groups and other health service provider interests, on the one side, and government agencies and insurance providers, on the other, can be expected to grow in frequency and intensity.
The co-evolution of professions, state licensure and medical practice has been important in another way, namely that physician organization represents a partial brake upon, and a partial conduit for, the influence of medical products and services companies such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology corporations, hospital corporations and insurance companies. As studies in law and history of medicine have documented (Rothman 1991 , Rodwin 2011 , physicians have developed institutions and norms for regulating "conflict of interest" and for the maintenance and renewal of "bioethics." These institutions can be thought to represent a force shaping the production and delivery of health services that is differentiable both from (a) the politics and organization of national health insurance that would seek to impose larger social policy aims upon the delivery of care, and from (b) medical product and insurance companies that would seek to shape health services to their ends. Yet precisely because health professionals have gatekeeping power over heavily demanded medicines and services to which patients attach hope, health professionals both individually and collectively are the target of vast campaigns to influence their perceptions, judgments and behavior. The way that governments and professions regulate these conflicts of interest is highly variable across societies (Rodwin 2011 Beyond the licensure of individual medical services, two other features of health service regulation and legitimation deserve greater scrutiny. First, governments and societies differ in the degree to which they regulate health service organizations such as hospitals and medical clinics. In the United States, these organizations are regulated at multiple levels of government, not least through state-level agencies and restricted entry through "certificates of need." In Britain, hospitals rest under the penumbra of the National Health Service, while in France they are regulated more directly by regional agencies under the ministry of Health and there is a significant proprietary sector (Rodwin and Sandier 1993) . Second, there are varying degrees to which putative errors made in the practice of medicine or healing are subject to lawsuit or are "tortiable"; the United States saw relatively strong physician organization in the 20 th century (Starr 1982 , Chapin 2010 ) yet also has one of the larger tortbased regimes of medical malpractice. There is not strong evidence, however, that medical malpractice is a primary driver of the extreme spiral of health costs in the U.S. (Baker 2005) .
Regulation of Medical Products -Gatekeeping and Conceptual Power. The power of the state
is also somewhat different in the arena of health. Not only are many medicines and medical products separated from the citizen by the gatekeeping agency of the physician or health professional, who must prescribe or authorize patients to consume them, but in nearly all countries worldwide most medicines must be authorized for marketing and prescription by a government agency before doctors or patients can use them. As Carpenter (2010) argues, this degree of control over product entry into new markets is rare in the global regulation of industries and markets, and it is to a great degree premised and practiced upon emulation of one or another aspect of "the American model" of pharmaceutical regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). It is common to justify such regulation by the safety risks and/or information asymmetry between the producer of these products and their
consumers. Yet while a vast array of other products poses great health and safety risks to consumers, governments do not require their pre-market approval by administrative agencies before they reach the consumer. So too, many other examples of 'credence goods' (repair services and, by some accounting, financial products) exist where there is no discretionary administrative gatekeeper separating the consumer from the product. 6 In many respects, physician services and professional licensure would appear to be the closest analog to pharmaceuticals, yet it is remarkable that in many countries, the dominant professional organizations of medicine play little direct role in drug and device approval.
The regulation of pharmaceuticals has long been a central concern of political scientists (Quirk 1980; Marks 1997; Carpenter 2002 Carpenter , 2004 Carpenter , 2010 Carpenter and Ting 2007; Moffitt 2010; Maor 2011) .
Several features of this form of regulation -termed "approval regulation" by recent scholars (Carpenter 2004, Carpenter and Ting 2007) precisely because of the gatekeeping power of the state -are of interest. First, it has been shown that in the regulation of new drugs, agencies such as the FDA are typically not shaped, at least not linearly or in the short-term, by the ideological or partisan composition 6 In the standard typology of goods as defined in microeconomic theory, "ordinary goods" are those in which quality is immediately observable (goods in general equilibrium theory), inspection goods are those whose quality can be observed without purchasing the good (trying out a hammer at a hardware store), experience goods are those that need to be consumed or purchased in order for their quality to be inferred (an internet service, a job, for example), and credence goods are those whose quality cannot be known even after purchase and consumption.
of the politicians overseeing them (Carpenter 2002) . Second, while pharmaceutical and medical product companies have vast power, this power falls far short of dominance (Carpenter 2010) , and much of the evidence amassed for the hypothesis of capture or industry dominance in fact fits with other explanations (Carpenter 2004) . Third, the form of politics that most heavily shapes drug and device regulation in the United States and worldwide is not partisan or ideological politics, and not even distributive politics or moral politics, but a politics of legitimacy or reputation (Carpenter 2010 , Moffitt 2010 , Maor 2011 ). This is not to deny the vast, and growing, power of the global pharmaceutical
industry. Yet that industry has developed within the structure imposed by global drug regulators (especially the FDA), not vice versa, and many of the critical developments in global pharmaceutical regulation arrived over the explicit and coordinated opposition of companies.
[ Table 1 about here.]
An important feature of global pharmaceutical regulation is its high degree of standardization.
Compared to the wide variation in national health insurance systems and in public health programs, the development of medicines (and to a lesser extent, medical devices) appears to be characterized by a stable system of institutions that, while not universal, shares some highly common features (Table 1) .
To begin with, the approval of medicines is conducted worldwide by agencies of the state, most commonly national government agencies, but also pan-national agencies like the European Medicines Brand-name drugs can be replaced by generic drugs, but only after these have demonstrated "bioequivalence" -roughly the idea that the generic drug performs the same in the body as does the brand-name drug, with tests using blood samples. In short, from inception to commercialization, drugs and other medical products pass through, and are governed by, a set of institutions and procedures that display remarkable similarity worldwide.
The source of this standardization varies. In part, as Carpenter (2010) While abundant similarities in institutional form for medical product governance gesture to the power of regulatory and global institutions, they also enable interesting cross-national comparisons (Maor 2011) . When so much about health product governance is standardized, the cross-national differences become clearer upon examination and the similarity provided by standardization offers a ready-made set of "control" variables that have already been accounted for. In an interesting paper, What, then, is plausibly different about health politics in the regulation of services and treatments? The convergence of nations upon the broad parameters of an "approval regulation" model of health products governance, with strong empowerment of professionally and governmentallylegitimated scientists and healers.
Identity, Disease and Global Health
Health politics involves claims about identity and representation that both map onto existing lines of difference -gender, racial and other identities; political ideology; partisanship -and create and refract new lines of difference. The manner in which health politics shapes these new forms of politics has much to do with arguments over public spending and public functions. Yet they also concern the intimate relationship between health, human experience as lived tangibly and physiologically, and well being. Health, and hence health politics, often touches physical human experience in particularly direct and tangible ways. Health is, again, a constitutive part of human welfare and human identity, involving our motor abilities and capacity to move (hence affecting our employment, and our citizenship), shaping our mood (hence our personal expression and features of our identity), shaping our sexual function and procreation, and affecting those around us (our kinship networks and communities). It is, to put matters differently, one thing to discuss the lived bodily experience or the prospect of illness and death in a debate about financial regulation, employment prospects, even counter-terrorism policy. Yet these intimate and tangible matters occupy "center stage" in health politics, infusing it with different meaning and emotive content. So too, discussions over what might, in other settings, be considered private and physical, often enter the contestation of health politics -a cancer of the breast or testes that might deserve special research or access to services, a disease disproportionately common in a marginalized population and how its sufferers should be identified, an infective illness and the role of government coercion in reducing its spread. Health and illness shape who we are politically.
If ever a "test case" arose in which these dynamics of identity were revealed, it came in the explosive carnage wrought by the global epidemic of acquired immune deficiency syndrome ( The global, national, and local effects of AIDS are still being felt in ways that deserve continued study. There remain rich questions for political scientists to pursue. Scholars could follow Cohen (1999) and ask whether particular ethnic groups with previously cohesive identities (at least along some dimensions) have struggled with new divisions. Scholars could follow Lieberman (2009) 
Contestation and Conceptual Power: How Health Politics Shapes the Medical and Health
Sciences. Whether exercised through professional orders and hierarchies or through the standardsetting and veto force of regulators, the conceptual power of experts and the state remains contested.
Important features of modern science and health -even the use of certain statistical measures and estimators -have been shaped by political, administrative and interest group factors. Beyond the studies of pharmaceutical regulation mentioned above, two insightful studies by Epstein (1998 Epstein ( , 2007 demonstrate the shaping role of politics in science and medical knowledge. In an examination of the AIDS crisis, Epstein demonstrates how AIDS activists were able to challenge, and then reshape, paradigms of law and medical science such as the placebo-controlled trial, the phased-drug system, and the control of experimental medicines, not to mention public research funding. AIDS groups did so not merely by directly challenging government agencies such as the FDA and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), but also by taking matters of clinical treatment and experiment into their own hands. Gay men's and AIDS groups opened their own pharmacies and treatment centers. They organized their own experiments and, in effect, created their own laboratories. They recruited scientists more sympathetic to their concerns about an alternative ethics and methodology of experiment. Not the least of the fruits of their efforts were significant changes to the FDA's drug approval paradigm (Epstein 1997; Carpenter 2010, Chapter 6) , with the introduction of fast-track approval procedures and "treatment investigational new drugs" (treatment INDs), in which drugs could be released for marketing on a compassionate basis before all three phases of clinical testing had been completed.
In a more recent study of how minority populations get excluded from and included in medical research studies, Epstein (2007) shows how a form of identity politics shaped concepts of causal and statistical heterogeneity -not merely the idea that human subjects are different, but that some treatments might have different effects in and among these different groups. Women's groups and racial minority organizations successfully pushed for the creation of embedded representation bureaus inside federal health agencies (e.g., the FDA's Office of Women's Health, and the Office of Research on Minority Health (ORMH) at the NIH). They also pushed for the creation of statistical subsamples (sometimes oversamples) of their population. In so doing they gave powerful political force as well as social rationales to the idea of "subgroup analysis," where the hypothesis tested in a statistical study would be tested within and between various subsamples that are differentiated by gender, race or another marker of identity. So powerful were these forces that now widely accepted methods such as "subgroup analysis" and examination of "heterogeneous causal effects" of medical treatments can be said to owe their origins, in part, to what began as a political critique of exclusionary practices. The insistence of contemporary statisticians and social scientists in talking about "average treatment effects" is a silent bow to this stunning new reality; if there is a population of treatment effects and the causal effect of a medicine or even policy will differ by the race, gender, ethnicity, identity or social positioning of the subject, then much of the simpler statistical paradigm of the twentieth century must be conditioned. Causal effects are, under this reasoning, "contingent." Epstein's creative and careful analysis deserves application to other settings, not least global health.
Voice, Money and Illness: Political Organization and Publicity by Disease. The experience of AIDS has become a paradigm for another set of understandings, namely that differentiation among illnesses can create a form of distributive politics. A critical set of limited resources -research money, funding for insurance reimbursement, public attention and philanthropy, legislative initiative, even compassion itself -can be divided among ascriptive "interest groups," which in recognition of this distribution organize and render public and private claims upon these resources. The process is undoubtedly more complicated than this, for the attribution of group in-status for someone with an illness often proceeds much more opaquely, contingently and less public than, say, the process of ascribing gender, ethnic or racial identity. Yet the comparison is meaningful, not least because the past thirty years have witnessed an immense growth of disease-specific associations and lobbies in American national politics (Greenberg 1998; Armstrong, Carpenter and Hojnacki 2007) .
A classic article by Colby and Cook (1991) is different in so many respects that it must, under many conditions, be examined separately from the other illnesses. They also find that eight of these diseases received so little public news coverage that there was too little data for statistical analysis. Among the remaining seven, Armstrong, Carpenter and
Hojnacki find a positive but small association between changes in mortality and overall coverage, and a rather striking association whereby increases in the fraction of incidence among African-Americans predict corresponding declines in the television and print news coverage of that illness. These findings are merely suggestive, the authors point out, and await historical and ethnographic research as well as more general quantitative analysis of samples with a wider disease sample. What, finally, is plausibly different about health politics in its patterns of identity and difference?
The way in which illness creates identities and political organizations (latent and explicit) that would not otherwise arrange themselves along the same lines of cleavage, and the way in which the resulting identity politics shape scientific and technical concepts and methods. Appropriately, the review here has been limited in its objectives and in its reach.
Conclusion
As the field of health politics progresses, there are a number of particular questions to which scholars should orient their inquiry. To inject my own judgment more directly, I would call for a strong degree of methodological pluralism -one that existing studies of health politics have already shown, but which can be improved upon, and one that is necessary for a richer understanding of health politics.
Consider the following subjects, puzzles and questions:  The politics of obesity, both as a critical policy issue and as a dimension of difference that is intimately and troublingly bound up with race, gender and class; the public health strategies and institutions of obesity in the developing world seem of particular relevance for political scientists;
 public health agendas and agencies at the local and national levels, and the process by which foundations, national states, disease lobbies and global health companies shape them;
 the growth of global corporations and their political power in health services provision and health products, and in national politics generally.
I conclude on a historical note, namely that in the early 20 th century as American political science was launching its professional networks and forging a new identity, we would not be having this conversation (or, at least, not having anything like the same conversation). The scholarly analysis of health and health politics focuses, appropriately, upon recent policy developments and population health changes. Yet we should not ignore or surrender the longue duree perspective by which health expenditure now dwarf national security expenditures and many other categories of effort, expenditure and division. The significant growth of human civilization and the elongation of human life has laid the foundation for some of its most gripping and divisive controversies. Divisive battles over health insurance have arrived in part because human societies have reached a certain level of wealth and health. Historically, poorer societies of short-lived human agents were more likely to battle over other questions. These patterns will endure, and they will render health politics more important -and perhaps more differentiable from other realms with which political scientists are both comfortable and familiar -in the decades to come.
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